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ABSTRACT
GRADUATE ADMISSION PROBLEM WITH QUOTA
AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
Mehmet Karakaya
M.A. in Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
September, 2003
In this thesis, we have studied the graduate admission problem with quota and
budget constraints as a two sided matching market. We constructed algorithms
which are extensions of the Gale - Shapley algorithm and showed that if the
algorithms stop then the resulting matchings are core stable (and thus Pareto
optimal). However the algorithms may not stop for some problems. Also it is
possible that the algorithms do not stop and there is a core stable matching.
Also there is no department optimal matching and no student optimal matching
under budget constraints. Hence straightforward extensions of the Gale - Shapley
algorithm do not work for the graduate admission problem with quota and budget
constraints. The presence of budget constraints play an important role in these
results.
Keywords: pairwise stable matching, core stable matching, Pareto optimal match-
ing, the Gale - Shapley algorithm, quota and budget constraints.
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O¨ZET
KOTA VE BU¨TC¸E KISITLARI ALTINDA DOKTORA
KABUL PROBLEMI˙
Mehmet Karakaya
Ekonomi, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticsi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
Eylu¨l, 2003
Bu tez c¸alıs¸masında kota ve bu¨tc¸e kısıtları altında doktora kabul problemi iki
taraflı es¸les¸me olarak incelenmis¸tir. Gale - Shapley algoritmasının uzantıları olan
c¸es¸itli algoritmalar yazılmıs¸ ve bu algoritmalardan biri ic¸in algoritma durursa
olus¸an es¸les¸menin c¸ekirdek kararlı (ve bo¨ylece Pareto en iyi) oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Fakat bu algoritmalar bazı problemler ic¸in durmadıg˘ı gibi, algoritmaların dur-
madıg˘ı ve c¸ekirdek kararlı bir es¸les¸menin bulundug˘u durumlar da mevcuttur.
Ayrıca bu¨tc¸e kısıtı altında bo¨lu¨m optimal es¸les¸me ve o¨g˘renci optimal es¸les¸me
yoktur. Bu yu¨zden Gale - Shapley algoritmasının uzantıları olan algoritmalar
kota ve bu¨tc¸e kısıtları altında doktora kabul problemi ic¸in kendilerinden bekle-
nen is¸levi yerine getirmemektedir. Bu¨tc¸e kısıtının varlıg˘ı bu sonuc¸larda o¨nemli
bir rol oynamaktadır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : ikili kararlı es¸les¸me, c¸ekirdek kararlı es¸les¸me, Pareto en iyi
es¸les¸me, Gale - Shapley algoritması, kota ve bu¨tc¸e kısıtları.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A typical two-sided matching market consists of two disjoint finite sets, for ex-
ample a set of men and a set of women; colleges and students; firms and workers.
A matching is called a one-to-one matching if a member of one set is allowed to
match with at most one member of other set, for example a man (woman) can
match with only one woman (man). However, a firm hires many workers, but a
worker works for one firm only. This type of matching is called a many-to-one
matching.
There is a rich literature on matching theory (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)
for an excellent survey for a period covering all classical results in the field) in-
cluding both theoretical and empirical studies. Even though there is an extensive
literature on matching theory, there is no study considering both quota and bud-
get constraints simultaneously. There are studies where colleges (or firms) have
either quota constraint or budget constraint but not both. In this thesis, we study
the graduate admission problem under quota and budget constraints. There is a
set of departments belonging to one university and a set of students (applicants)
who wish to enter these departments. Each department faces both quota and
budget constraints which are determined by the university.
Hall (1935) considered a marriage problem involving a group of men and
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women in a society where a man may marry a woman only if they have previ-
ously been introduced. Men have no preferences for women and women have no
preferences for men. The aim is to maximize the number of people that can be
matched. Hall showed that a complete set of marriages is possible if and only if
every subset of men has collectively been introduced to at least as many women
as the number of men in that subset, and vice versa.
Gale and Shapley (1962) described a model for college admissions problem. A
college admission problem consists of a finite set of students and a finite set of
colleges where each college faces a quota constraint. Each student has a linear
preference relation over colleges and each college has a linear preference relation
over sets of students. A student matches with a college or with herself (i.e., stays
unmatched) and a college matches with a group of students whose size does not
exceed its quota. A matching is blocked by a student iff she prefers to match
with herself to getting matched with the college that she is assigned under that
matching. A matching is blocked by a college iff it prefers a strict subset of
the group of students that it matched under the given matching. A matching
is blocked by a student - college pair iff the student prefers that college to her
match and the college prefers the union of a proper subset of its match with
the student to its present match. A matching is stable iff it is not blocked by
a student, by a college and by a student - college pair. From each given set
of students a college selects its most prefferred such set of students obeying the
quota constraint. This most preffered set of students is referred as the choice
of that college from among the group of students it faces. A stable matching is
student optimal iff each student likes this matching at least as well as any other
stable matching. A stable matching is college optimal iff each college likes this
matching at least as well as any other stable matching.
The following algorithm is referred as the Gale - Shapley student optimal
algorithm:
Step 1 : Each student proposes to her most preferred college. Each college rejects
all but those who comprise its choice among its proposers.
In general, at step k,
Step k : Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her
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next prefferred college. Each college rejects all but those who comprise its choice
within the students it has been holding together with its new proposers.
The algorithm stops if there is no student such that her proposal is rejected. Then
each student is matched with a college that she proposed at the last step and was
not rejected by that college. The Gale - Shapley college optimal algorithm is
similarly defined with colleges proposing to group of students by obeying their
quota constraints.
A college has substitutable preferences if it regards students as substitutes
rather than as complements, i.e., the college prefers to enroll a student who is in its
choice set even if some of the other students in its choice set become unavailable.
When colleges have substitutable preferences the set of stable matchings is non-
empty. That is the Gale - Shapley student optimal algorithm produces a stable
student optimal matching (similarly the Gale - Shapley college optimal algorithm
produces a stable college optimal matching).
Note that the Gale-Shapley algorithm has been used since 1951 (before Gale
and Shapley’s paper) in the United States to match medical residents to hospitals
(for the analysis of the matching program see Roth (1984)).
Kelso and Crawford (1982) considered a model for labor markets as a many
to one matching market. There are a finite set of workers and a finite set of
firms. Firms do not face quota or budget constraints. Each worker has a utility
of working for a firm with a salary that is paid by that firm. It is assumed that all
workers are gross substitutes from the viewpoint of each firm. This assumption is
referred as gross substitutes condition. In order to define this condition formally,
we need some notation which is introduced below following Kelso and Crawford:
Let w denote a generic element of the set of workers and f a generic element of
the set of firms. Firm f ’s gross product (measured in terms of salaries) is denoted
by yf (Cf ), where Cf is the set of workers hired by firm f . The net profit of firm
f is defined by pif (Cf , sf ) = yf (Cf ) −∑w∈Cf swf , where sf = (s1f , . . . , smf ) is
the vector of salaries faced by firm f . When firm f faces a vector of salaries
sf = (s1f , . . . , smf ), firm f chooses a set C
f of workers which maximizes its net
profit. Let M f (sf ) denote the sets of workers that maximize net profit of firm f .
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Consider two vectors of salaries sf and s˜f faced by firm f . Let T f (Cf ) = {w |
w ∈ Cf and s˜wf = swf}. The gross substitutes condition is that
for all firms, if Cf ∈ M f (sf ) and s˜f = sf , then there exists C˜f ∈ M f (s˜f ) such
that T f (Cf ) ⊆ C˜f .
That is firms regard workers as substitutes rather than as complements. ”The
gross substitutes assumption states that all workers be (weak) gross substitutes
to each firm, in the sense that increases in other workers’ salaries can never cause
a firm to withdraw an offer from a worker whose salary has not risen.” Thus the
production technology is such that workers are not complements.
Kelso and Crawford (1982) showed the existence of a core allocation by an
extension of the Gale - Shapley algorithm. That is there is a matching such that
there is no subgroup consisting of firms and workers which blocks that matching.
They also showed that there is a firm optimal core allocation, i.e., there is a core
matching that each firm likes at least as well as any other core matching.
Mongell and Roth (1986) considered the model of Kelso and Crawford together
with budget constraints for firms. They showed by an example that the core of
the market may be empty. They also gave an example to show that if the set
of core allocations is non-empty, it is possible that there be no firm optimal core
matching.
In this thesis, we consider graduate admission problem as a two-sided matching
market. There are a set of students and a set of departments which belong to
one university. Each department faces quota and budget constraints which are
determined centrally by the university. Students apply to these departments for
their graduate studies and each student has a value added to each department.
If a student matches with a department she may be paid by the department or
she may pay to the department. If a student pays for her graduate study, that
payment is not added to the department’s budget for graduate admissions. That
payment goes to the university which gives some percentage of that payment to
the department for its office expenditures. Departments use their budgets for the
payments to graduate students, and if a department has some of its budget left
after these payments, the remaining part is used for office expenditures by the
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department. Each department gets a benefit from its accepted students and its
office expenditures. The total benefit of a department from its accepted students
is the sum of each accepted student’s value added to the department. Each
department wants to maximize its gross benefit which is sum of the benefits
from accepted students and from office expenditures. We assume that, for any
department, the largest benefit from office expenditures is less than any qualified
student’s benefit to the department no matter how large the office expenditures
are. Therefore, each department wants to maximize its gross benefit by accepting
more qualified students at a minimum cost. Each student wants to make graduate
study at her most preferred department.
Our model differs from the previous models in the sense that departments face
both quota and budget constraints. Here we construct some algorithms which are
extensions of the Gale - Shapley algorithm and show that, if the algorithms stop,
the resulting matchings are core stable (and thus Pareto optimal). However the
algorithms do not always stop and it turns out to be possible that the algorithms
do not stop while the set of core stable matchings is non-empty. Hence we can
say that for the model considered in this paper (two sided matching market with
quota and budget constraints) straightforward extensions of the Gale - Shapley
algorithm do not work in contrast to college admissions and labor market mod-
els without budget constraints. Moreover, the existence of either a department
optimal or a student optimal matching is not guaranteed in our setting. In sum-
mary, the presence of budget constraints seems to change the picture in a radical
fashion.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: We present the model and
definitions in chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines the relationships between different
notions introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 4 defines the algorithm and presents
the result that the final matching is core stable if the algorithm stops. Chapter
4 also presents two examples in the first of which the algorithm does not stop,
and there is no core stable matching. In the second one the algorithm again
does not stop but there is now a core stable matching. Chapter 5 considers a
modified model where students wish only to have their reservation prices and
defines another algorithm for this model. Chapter 6 starts with observations
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regarding our algorithms and then concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Basic Notions
We denote the finite nonempty set of departments of our university by
D = {d1, d2, . . . , dm}. A finite nonempty set of students denoted by S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sn}, is regarded as comprising the applicants to this university for
graduate programs offered by its departments.
Each department d ∈ D has a quota qd and a budget bd for its graduate
program; both of which are determined centrally by the university. A student
can enroll to at most one department, and each department accepts a group of
students obeying its quota and budget constraints.
We assume that each student s ∈ S has a qualification level for each depart-
ment d ∈ D. The qualification level of student s for department d is an integer
and denoted by asd. The qualification levels of student s for the departments are
denoted by a vector asD = (a
s
d1
, asd2 , . . . , a
s
dm
). Also we assume that each depart-
ment has a minimal qualification level as a threshold for accepting students. The
minimal qualification level of department d is a positive integer and denoted by
ad.
Each student yields a benefit (or adds a value) to each department if accepted
to that department. These values are independent of who the other accepted
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students are, i.e., there are no externalities in this regard. The benefit of de-
partment d obtained from accepting a group of students Sd ⊆ S is denoted by
yd(Sd). We assume that department d’s benefit yd(Sd) is additive, i.e., it is the
sum of the accepted students’ benefits to the department. We assume that the
benefit student s provides to department d is equal to her qualification level for
department d, i.e., yd({s}) = asd. Therefore the total benefit of department d
from accepting a group of students Sd ⊆ S is yd(Sd) =∑s∈Sd asd.
If a student gets enrolled to a department for graduate study, she may be paid
by the department or she may pay to the department. The amount of payment
made by department d to student s is an integer msd. In other words, student
s is paid by department d the amount msd if msd > 0; there is no payment if
msd = 0; student s pays to department d the amount msd if msd < 0. If an
accepted student pays for her graduate study at department d, this payment is
not added to department d’s budget. That payment is taken by the university
and the university gives some fixed percentage of this payment to department d,
solely to be used, say, for its office expenditures.
We assume that each student s has a reservation price for each department
d (the lowest amount of money that student s will accept from department d)
which will be denoted by an integer σsd. We assume that for all s ∈ S and for all
d ∈ D, σsd ≤ bd. Student s’s reservation prices for departments will be denoted
by a vector σs = (σsd1 , . . . , σsdm). Note that a reservation price may also be
negative, representing the level of willingness on the part of the student to pay
to the department in question to get accepted.
If department d has some remaining budget after payments, the remaining
money is only used for office expenditures by the department. Let B be the
total budget of the university, and let student s be the least qualified student
for department d among all students who are qualified for department d, i.e.,
asd ≥ ad and for all h ∈ S \ {s} with ahd ≥ ad, we have asd ≤ ahd . Let dB be
the benefit of department d if it uses the university’s entire budget B for its
office expenditures. We assume that yd({s}) > dB. Therefore, the benefit which
is gained by spending B for the office expenditures is less than any qualified
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student’s benefit to department d. This means that one can take ad = 1 and
0 < dB < 1 for each d ∈ D.
The total benefit of department d is denoted by Y d and it is the sum of benefits
from accepted students and office expenditures. Therefore when Sd ⊆ S is the
accepted group of students by department d and d is the benefit that department
d gets from office expenditures, we have that Y d(Sd, d) = yd(Sd) + d.
Definition 1 A graduate admission problem is a list (D,S, q, b, aS, σ) where
1. D is a finite nonempty set of departments,
2. S is a finite nonempty set of students,
3. q = (qd)d∈D is the departments’ quotas with qd ∈ N for each d ∈ D,
4. b = (bd)d∈D is the departments’ budgets with bd ∈ N0 1 for each d ∈ D,
5. aS = (asD)s∈S is the students’ qualification levels for departments with a
s
d ∈
Z for each s ∈ S, d ∈ D,
6. σ = (σs)s∈S is the students’ reservation prices for departments with σsd ∈ Z
and σsd ≤ bd for each s ∈ S, d ∈ D.
The preferences of departments and students are implicitly contained in the
definition of a graduate admission problem and can be made explicit as follows:
The strict preference relation of department d is denoted by Pd. For all d ∈ D,
Pd is a linear order
2 on 2S × R.
Consider two group of students Sd and S´d. Let cd denote the cost of group of
students Sd to department d, i.e., cd =
∑
s∈S¯d msd with S¯
d = {s ∈ Sd | msd > 0},
and c´d the cost of group of students S´d to department d, i.e., c´d =
∑
s∈ ¯´Sd m´sd
with
¯´
S
d
= {s ∈ S´d | m´sd > 0}. Let d denote the benefit of office expenditures
that department d obtains by accepting the group of students Sd at cost cd, and
1N0 = N
⋃ {0}
2A linear order on a set X is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric (binary) relation.
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´d the benefit of office expenditures that department d obtains by accepting the
group of students S´d at cost c´d.
Note that (Sd, cd) = (S´d, c´d) does not imply that Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d). To
clarify this point consider the following example:
Let Sd = S´d = {s1, s2}, and ms1d = 50 = ms2d; m´s1d = 100, m´s2d = −100. Note
that cd = ms1d + ms2d = 50 + 50 = 100 and c´
d = m´s1d = 100. We have that
(Sd, cd) = (S´d, c´d). However Y d(S´d, ´d) > Y d(Sd, d), since ´d > d.
Now department d strictly prefers Sd to S´d if Y d(Sd, d) > Y d(S´d, ´d).
If Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d) then department d considers the associated costs
of Sd and S´d. That is whenever Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d) department d strictly
prefers Sd to S´d if cd < c´d.
If Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d) and cd = c´d, then department d makes a lexico-
graphic comparison among Sd and S´d in the following way:
Let | Sd |= n1 and | S´d |= n2. Let f : {1, . . . , n1} → {i | si ∈ Sd} be a function
such that f(1) < f(2) < . . . < f(n1). Let g : {1, . . . , n2} → {j | sj ∈ S´d} be a
function such that g(1) < g(2) < . . . < g(n2).
We say that department d leximin prefers Sd to S´d if and only if f(1) < g(1)
or ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , n} where n < min{n1, n2} such that ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , k} f(t) = g(t)
but f(t+ 1) < g(t+ 1).
Now we can define Pd formally as follows:
∀(Sd, cd), (S´d, c´d) ∈ (2S × R) with (Sd, cd) 6= (S´d, c´d),
[(Sd, cd)Pd(S´
d, c´d)] if and only if [Y d(Sd, d) > Y d(S´d, ´d)] or
[Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d) and cd < c´d] or
[Y d(Sd, d) = Y d(S´d, ´d) and cd = c´d and Sd leximin preferred to S´d].
Rd is a preference relation of department d induced from Pd and defined as
follows:
∀(Sd, cd), (S´d, c´d) ∈ (2S × R),
[(Sd, cd)Rd(S´
d, c´d)] if and only if ¬[(S´d, c´d)Pd(Sd, cd)].
Hence, for any (Sd, cd), (S´d, c´d) ∈ (2S × R) with (Sd, cd) 6= (S´d, c´d), we have
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either [(Sd, cd)Pd(S´
d, c´d)] or [(S´d, c´d)Pd(S
d, cd)].
The strict preference relation of student s is denoted by Ps. For all s ∈ S, Ps
is a linear order on (D × R)⋃{(∅, 0)}.
We assume that, given any s ∈ S, σsd = σsd˜ if and only if d = d˜. We also
assume that (d, σsd)Ps(∅, 0) for all s ∈ S and all d ∈ D, where (∅, 0) stands for
the situation that student s is unmatched (or she is matched with herself).3
For all s ∈ S, Ps is defined as follows:
∀(d,msd), (d˜,msd˜) ∈ (D × R)
⋃{(∅, 0)},
[(d,msd)Ps(d˜,msd˜)] if and only if [msd − σsd > msd˜ − σsd˜] or
[msd − σsd = msd˜ − σsd˜ and σsd < σsd˜].
Rs is a preference relation of student s induced from Ps and defined as follows:
∀(d,msd), (d˜,msd˜) ∈ (D × R)
⋃{(∅, 0)},
[(d,msd)Rs(d˜,msd˜)] if and only if ¬[(d˜,msd˜Pd(d,msd)].
Note that whenever (d,msd) 6= (d˜,msd˜), we have either [(d,msd)Ps(d˜,msd˜)] or
[(d˜,msd˜Pd(d,msd)].
Note that being unmatched is not the worst situation for a student s ∈ S,
because for all s ∈ S, [(∅, 0)Ps(d,msd)] if [msd < σsd] for any d ∈ D.
Now we will define what we mean by a matching.
Definition 2 By a matching we mean a function µ : S −→ (D× R)⋃{(∅, 0)}
which matches each student s with a member µ1(s) of D
⋃{∅} and also specifies
the amount of transfer µ2(s) made from µ1(s) to s such that the following are
satisfied:
1. For all d ∈ D, | Sdµ |≤ qd (quota constraint),
where Sdµ = {s ∈ S | µ1(s) = d},
2. For all d ∈ D, cdµ ≤ bd (budget constraint),
3We assume that for all s ∈ S, σs∅ = 0.
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where cdµ =
∑
s∈S¯dµ m
µ
sd with m
µ
sd = µ2(s) for µ1(s) = d and S¯
d
µ={s ∈ Sdµ |
mµsd > 0}.
3. For all d ∈ D, for all s ∈ Sdµ, asd ≥ ad (qualification level constraint).
Student s is matched with a department if µ1(s) ∈ D, she is unmatched if
µ1(s) = ∅ under µ.
Let Y dµ denote the total benefit of department d under µ. Let y
d
µ denote the
benefit of department d that it obtains by accepting the group of students Sdµ and
dµ the benefit of department d that it gets from office expenditures under µ.
Department d’s preference relation Rd induces a preference relation R
µ
d over
matchings in a natural fashion as follows:
For any matchings µ¯ and µ˜,
[µ¯Rµd µ˜] if and only if [(S
d
µ¯, c
d
µ¯)Rd(S
d
µ˜, c
d
µ˜)]. We abuse notation and we use Rd for
Rµd .
Students s’s preference relation Rs similarly induces a preference relation R
µ
s
over matchings as follows:
For any matchings µ¯ and µ˜,
[µ¯Rµs µ˜] if and only if [(µ¯1(s),m
µ¯
sµ¯1(s)
)Rs(µ˜1(s),m
µ˜
sµ˜1(s)
)]. We abuse notation and
we use Rs for R
µ
s .
To present a matching µ, we will use a matrix consisting of three rows and
n columns, where n =| S |. The first row lists the set of students respecting
their original labeling; the second row specifies the departments the students are
assigned to and the third row consists of the associated money transfers. That is
µ =

s1 s2 . . . sn
µ1(s1) µ1(s2) . . . µ1(sn)
mµs1µ1(s1) m
µ
s2µ1(s2)
. . . mµsnµ1(sn)

Definition 3 A matching µ is individually rational if and only if it satisfies
the following properties
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1. For all s ∈ S, mµsµ1(s) ≥ σsµ1(s), and
2. For all d ∈ D, Y dµ ≥ 0.
Definition 4 We say that a matching µ is blocked by a student - department
pair (s, d) ∈ S ×D with µ1(s) 6= d if and only if there exists a payment m˜sd such
that
1. (d, m˜sd)Ps(µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
), and
2. [(Sdµ \B)
⋃{s}, cˆd]Pd[Sdµ, cdµ],
for some B ⊆ Sdµ, with
cˆd =
{ ∑
h∈(S¯dµ\B)m
µ
hd + m˜sd if m˜sd > 0∑
h∈(S¯dµ\B)m
µ
hd otherwise
such that [((Sdµ \B)
⋃{s}), cˆd] satisfies the quota and budget constraints of
department d, i.e., | (Sdµ \B)
⋃{s} |≤ qd and cˆd ≤ bd.
A pair (s, d) that satisfies above two conditions is called a blocking pair for
matching µ.
Definition 5 A matching µ is pairwise stable if and only if it is individually
rational and there is no pair (s, d) which blocks it.
Now we will define group blocking of a matching µ.
Definition 6 We say that a matching µ is blocked by a group (D˜, S˜) with D˜ ⊆ D
and S˜ ⊆ S if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. For all s ∈ Sˆd, [(d, m˜sd)Ps(µ1(s),mµsµ1(s))],
where d ∈ D˜, and Sˆd ⊆ S˜ with for all s ∈ Sˆd, µ1(s) 6= d,
2. For all d ∈ D˜, [(Sdµ \B)
⋃
Sˆd, cˆd]Pd[S
d
µ, c
d
µ],
for some B ⊆ Sdµ with cˆd =
∑
h∈(S¯dµ\B)m
µ
hd +
∑
s∈ ¯ˆSd m˜sd such that
¯ˆ
S
d
= {s ∈ Sˆd | m˜sd > 0} and [((Sdµ \ B)
⋃
Sˆd), cˆd] satisfies the quota and
budget constraints of department d, i.e., | [(Sdµ \B)
⋃
Sˆd] |≤ qd and cˆd ≤ bd.
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Note that Sˆd ⊆ S˜ denote the group of students who matched with department
d ∈ D˜ by group blocking of µ, so for all s ∈ Sˆd, µ1(s) 6= d, and
⋃
d∈D˜ Sˆ
d = S˜.
The amount of money m˜sd denote the transfer between department d ∈ D˜ and a
student s ∈ Sˆd.
Definition 7 We say that a matching µ is core stable if and only if µ is indi-
vidually rational and there exists no group (D˜, S˜) which blocks µ.
Proposition 1 A matching µ is core stable if and only if µ is individually ratio-
nal and there exists no pair (consisting of a department d and a group of students
S˜ ⊆ S) (d, S˜) which blocks µ.4
Proof Take any core stable matching µ. By definition, µ is individually rational
and there exists no pair (d, S˜) which blocks µ.
For the other part of the proof, take any individually rational matching µ
such that there exists no pair (d, S˜) which blocks µ. Suppose that µ is not core
stable. Then there exists a group (consisting of a group of departments D˜ ⊆ D
and a group of students S˜) (D˜, S˜) which blocks µ. The cardinality of the group
of departments must be equal or greater than two, i.e., | D˜ |≥ 2. Otherwise we
have a contradiction with the absence of a pair (d, S˜) which blocks µ.
W.l.o.g. assume that D˜ = {d, d´}. A student can match with at most one
department, so a student s ∈ S˜ matches with either department d or department
d´. Let Sˆd ⊂ S˜ denote the group of students who matched with department d
and Sˆ d´ ⊂ S˜ denote the group of students who matched with department d´ in the
blocking matching. Now, the following two conditions are satisfied.
1. For all s ∈ Sˆd,(d, m˜sd)Ps(µ1(s),msµ1(s)), and
for d ∈ D˜, [(Sdµ \B)
⋃
Sˆd, cˆd]Pd[S
d
µ, c
d
µ], where B ⊆ Sdµ,
2. For all s ∈ Sˆ d´, (d´, m˜sd´)Ps(µ1(s),msµ1(s)), and
for d´ ∈ D˜, [(S d´µ \ C)
⋃
Sˆ d´, cˆd´]Pd´[S
d´
µ, c
d´
µ], where C ⊆ S d´µ.
4In other words, an essential coalition for group blocking consists of a department and a
group of students.
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However above two conditions mean that both (d, Sˆd) and (d´, Sˆ d´) block µ,
yielding the desired contradiction. Hence µ is core stable. 
Definition 8 We say that a matching µ is Pareto dominated by another match-
ing µ˜ if and only if
1. for all i ∈ (S⋃D), µ˜Riµ, and
2. for some i ∈ (S⋃D), µ˜Piµ.
Definition 9 A matching µ is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists no
matching µ˜ which Pareto dominates µ.
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Chapter 3
Relationships Between Pairwise
Stability, Core Stability and
Pareto Optimality
In this chapter we examine the relationships between the notions of pairwise
stability, core stability and Pareto optimality.
Proposition 2 If a matching µ is core stable, then µ is pairwise stable.
Proof Obvious. 
However the converse of the above proposition is not true, i.e., a pairwise
stable matching may not be core stable.
Example 1 A pairwise stable but not core stable matching
Let D = {d1, d2} be the set of departments and S = {s1, s2, s3} the set of
students. The budgets and quotas of the departments are as follows: bd1 = 30,
bd2 = 50; qd1 = 2, qd2 = 2. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the
students are as given in table 3.1.
Consider the following matching µ:
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as1d1=15 a
s1
d2
= 8
as2d1=12 a
s2
d2
=30
as3d1=20 a
s3
d2
=25
σs1d1=12 σs1d2=10
σs2d1=25 σs2d2=40
σs3d1=11 σs3d2=20
Table 3.1: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 1
µ =

s1 s2 s3
∅ d2 d1
0 50 30

The matching µ is pairwise stable since there exists no pair (s, d) ∈ S × D
that blocks µ. Also note that µ is Pareto optimal. However µ is not core stable.
Since the group (d2, {s1, s3}) blocks µ with payments m˜s1d2 = 10 and m˜s3d2 =
40. Department d2 prefers the group of students {s1, s3} to student {s2}, i.e.,
[(s1, s3), 50]Pd2 [s2, 40], since a
s1
d2
+ as3d2 = 33 > 30 = a
s2
d2
. Student {s1} prefers
to be matched with department d2 at payment m˜s1d2 = 10 to be unmatched,
i.e., (d2, 10)Ps1(∅, 0). Student {s3} prefers to be matched with department d2 at
payment m˜s3d2 = 40 to be matched with department d1 at payment m
µ
s3d1
= 30,
i.e., (d2, 40)Ps3(d1, 30) since m˜s3d2 − σs3d2 = 40 − 20 = 20 > 19 = 30 − 11 =
mµs3d1 − σs3d1 .
Hence a pairwise stable matching need not be core stable. This example also
shows that a pairwise stable and Pareto optimal matching need not be core stable.
Example 2 A pairwise stable but not Pareto optimal matching
Let D = {d1, d2} be the set of departments and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} the set of
students. The quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qd1 = 2,
qd2 = 2; bd1 = bd2 = 100. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the
students are as given in table 3.2.
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as1d1= 0 a
s1
d2
=10
as2d1=20 a
s2
d2
=15
as3d1=10 a
s3
d2
= 0
as4d1=15 a
s4
d2
=20
σs1d1=40 σs1d2=25
σs2d1=80 σs2d2=70
σs3d1=25 σs3d2=40
σs4d1=70 σs4d2=80
Table 3.2: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 2
Consider the following matching µ:
µ =

s1 s2 s3 s4
∅ d1 ∅ d2
0 80 0 80

The matching µ is pairwise stable since there is no pair (s, d) ∈ S ×D which
blocks µ.1 However µ is not Pareto optimal, i.e., there is another matching which
Pareto dominates µ.
Now consider the following matching µ˜:
µ˜ =

s1 s2 s3 s4
d2 d2 d1 d1
25 75 25 75

The matching µ˜ Pareto dominates the matching µ, see this:
(d2, 25)Ps1(∅, 0), (d2, 75)Ps2(d1, 80),
(d1, 25)Ps3(∅, 0), (d1, 75)Ps4(d2, 80),
(Sd1µ˜ , c
d1
µ˜ )Pd1(S
d1
µ , c
d1
µ ), (S
d2
µ˜ , c
d2
µ˜ )Pd2(S
d2
µ , c
d2
µ ).
So we have that for all i ∈ (S⋃D), µ˜Piµ, i.e., µ˜ Pareto dominates µ.2
1However the matching µ is clearly not core stable as it will turn out not to be Pareto
optimal.
2The matching µ˜ is core stable.
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Hence a pairwise stable matching need not be Pareto optimal.
Example 3 A Pareto optimal but not pairwise stable matching
LetD = {d1, d2} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3} the set of students,
and the quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qd1 = 1, qd2 = 1;
bd1 = 30, bd2 = 50. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the students
are as given in table 3.3.
as1d1= 4 a
s1
d2
= 3
as2d1= 8 a
s2
d2
=10
as3d1=15 a
s3
d2
=15
σs1d1=10 σs1d2=15
σs2d1=20 σs2d2=30
σs3d1=30 σs3d2=40
Table 3.3: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 3
Consider the following matching µ:
µ =

s1 s2 s3
∅ d2 d1
0 30 30

The matching µ is Pareto optimal since there is no other matching that Pareto
dominates µ. However µ is not pairwise stable because the pair (s3, d2) blocks
the matching µ with m˜s3d2 = 41. To see this, note that (d2, 41)Ps3(d1, 30) and
(s3, 41)Pd2(s2, 30).
Hence a Pareto optimal matching need not be pairwise stable.
It is obvious that if a matching µ is core stable then µ is Pareto optimal.
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Chapter 4
Graduate Admission Algorithm
In this section we define an algorithm, to which we will refer to as the graduate
admission algorithm (GAA) which is an extension of the Gale - Shapley algorithm
for the graduate admission problem. The algorithm GAA is a centralized algo-
rithm, i.e., the departments’ and students’ preferences are assumed to be known
to a planner (or to a computer program) who matches students with departments
according to the rule of GAA. Hence, there is no agent who behaves strategically
to manipulate the algorithm.
We will show that when the algorithm GAA stops then the resulting matching
is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal). However GAA does not always stop.
To clarify this situation, we will give two examples at one of which the algorithm
GAA does not stop and there is no core stable matching, while in the other
example the algorithm GAA does not stop, but there is a core stable matching.
Time is measured discretely in the algorithm. Let msd(t) denote the offer that
department d makes to student s at time t.
According to the scenario behind our algorithm, given bd, qd and what offers
are permitted, at each time t, department d will maximize its total benefit Y dt =
yd(Sdt )+
d
t when it makes a permitted offer to a group of students S
d
t such that the
quota and budget constraints are satisfied, i.e., | (Sdt ) |≤ qd and
∑
s∈S¯dt msd(t) ≤
20
bd.
Now we can give the details of how the algorithm GAA works.
Graduate Admission Algorithm
t = 1: a) Each department d determines the group of students Sd1 that
maximizes its total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints with
msd(1) = σsd for all s ∈ Sd1 . That is, department d offers to students in Sd1
first their reservation prices.
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d tentatively accepts the group of students who accepted its
offers. Let T d1 denote the group of students who accepted department d’s offers
at time t = 1, T d1 ⊆ Sd1 .1
Now, at the end of time t = 1 we have a matching µ1 with S
d
µ1
= T d1 .
t = 2: a) Again each department d determines the group of students Sd2 that
maximizes its total benefit subject to its constraints where the offers now be of
the form:
msd(2) =
{
σsd + 1 if s ∈ Sd1 \ T d1
σsd otherwise
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d tentatively accepts the group of students T d2 ⊆ Sd2 who
accepted its offers.
In general, at time k,
t = k: a) Consider a student s to whom department d made offers before
period k the last of which took place in period t˜s < k. In case this offer was
1Sd1 \ T d1 is now the group of students who took an offer from department d and rejected it
at time t = 1.
21
rejected by s because she accepted department dˆ’s offer with which she got again
matched at the end of period k−1, i.e., µk−1(s) = dˆ, call such a student a rejector
of d prior to k. Let F dk denote the group of all rejectors of d prior to k.
2
Each department d determines the group of students Sdk solving the same kind
of optimization problem as before, where the offers are now of the following form:
msd(k) =

σsd if s /∈
⋃t=k−1
t=1 S
d
t
msd(t˜s) + 1 if s ∈ F dk
msd(t˜s) otherwise
Note that department d offers msd(k) to each student s ∈ Sdk .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d tentatively accepts the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk who
accepted its offers.
Stopping Rule
t = t?: The algorithm stops at time t? if each department d makes offers to
exactly the set of students who accepted its offers in the preceding period, i.e., if
we have for all d ∈ D, Sdt? = T dt?−1.
If the algorithm stops at t? the final matching µt? is regarded as the outcome
of the algorithm.
Proposition 3 If the algorithm GAA stops, then the final matching of the algo-
rithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
Proof Assume that the algorithm stops. Let the algorithm stop at time t? with
µt? denoting the final matching of the algorithm. So we have that, for all d ∈ D,
Sdt? = T
d
t?−1. We abuse notation that we use µ
? for µt? .
2Note that at time t = 1, we have that for all d ∈ D, F d1 = ∅, and at time t = 2, for all
d ∈ D, F d2 = Sd1 \ T d1 .
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Clearly µ? is individually rational, since mµ
?
sµ?1(s)
≥ σsµ?1(s) for all s ∈ S, and
Y dµ? ≥ 0 for all d ∈ D.
Now suppose that µ? is not core stable. So there is a group (d, S˜) which blocks
µ?. So we have that
1. for all s ∈ S˜, µ?1(s) 6= d,
2. for all s ∈ S˜, (d, m˜sd)Ps(µ?1(s),mµ
?
sµ?1(s)
),
3. [(Sdµ? \B)
⋃
S˜, cˆd]Pd[S
d
µ? , c
d
µ? ], for some B ⊆ Sdµ? .
Note that the algorithm requires department d to make the offers m˜sd to each
student s ∈ S˜ at time t?. Now, there are three possible cases.
Case 1. If there is a student s ∈ S˜ such that s /∈ ⋃t=t?−1t=1 Sdt , then we have
that m˜sd = σsd.
Case 2. Now assume that there is a student s ∈ S˜ such that s ∈ F dt? , and
let t˜s denote the time that department d made an offer to student s the last time
before time t?. Now m˜sd = msd(t˜s) + 1.
Case 3. If there is a student s ∈ S˜ such that s /∈ F dt? and department d made
an offer to student s at time t˜s the last time before time t
?, then m˜sd = msd(t˜s).
Therefore department d would make the offers m˜sd to each student s ∈ S˜
(by 3), and each student in S˜ would accept the offer (by 2). So department d
and the group S˜ of students would match at the outcome of the algorithm, in
contradiction with (1). Hence µ? is core stable, (and thus also Pareto optimal).

However the algorithm does not always stop. The following example demon-
strates this situation. Also note that there is no core stable matching for the
following example.
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Example 4 3 The algorithm GAA does not stop and there is no core
stable matching
Let D = {d1, d2}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qd1 = 1, qd2 = 2, bd1 = 440, bd2 = 1075,
and the qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in
table 4.1.
as1d1= 7 a
s1
d2
= 6
as2d1= 0 a
s2
d2
= 15
as3d1= 8 a
s3
d2
= 11
σs1d1=400 σs1d2= 300
σs2d1=440 σs2d2=1000
σs3d1=400 σs3d2= 700
Table 4.1: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 4
Now we apply the graduate admission algorithm:
t = 1: a) The solution set of department d1’s optimization is {s3} and the
optimizing set for department d2 is {s1, s3}, i.e., Sd11 = {s3}, Sd21 = {s1, s3}.
Department d1 offers σs3d1 = 400 to student s3, and
department d2 offers σs1d2 = 300 to student s1 and σs3d2 = 700 to student s3.
b) Student s1 accepts department d2’s offer σs1d2 = 300,
student s2 has no offer,
student s3 accepts department d1’s offer σs3d1 = 400 and rejects department d2’s
offer σs3d2 = 700.
c) Department d1 accepts {s3} and department d2 accepts {s1}, i.e., T d11 =
{s3}, T d21 = {s1}.
We have a matching
3This example is a modification of the example of Mongell and Roth (1986).
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µ1 =

s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d1
300 0 400

t = 2: a) Now Sd12 = {s3}, Sd22 = {s1, s3}.
Thus department d1 offers ms3d1(2) = σs3d1 = 400 to student s3,
department d2 offers ms1d2(2) = σs1d2 = 300 to student s1 and ms3d2(1) = σs3d2 +
1 = 701 to student s3.
b) Student s1 accepts department d2’s offer,
student s2 has no offer,
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer and rejects department d1’s offer.
c) Hence T d12 = ∅, T d22 = {s1, s3}.
So we have a new matching
µ2 =

s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
300 0 701

Note that, in further periods, department d1 and department d2 compete for
student s3 by increasing their offers. The maximal offer that department d1 makes
to student s3 is equal to its budget. Hence, eventually at some time t = l we have
following:
t = l: a) Now Sd1l = {s3}, Sd2l = {s1, s3}.
Department d1 offers ms3d1(l) = bd1 = 440 to student s3,
department d2 offers ms1d2(l) = 300 to student s1 and ms3d2(l) = 741 to student
s3.
b) Student s1 accepts department d2’s offer,
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student s2 has no offer,
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer and rejects department d1’s offer.
c) So, T d1l = ∅, T d2l = {s1, s3}.
At time l we have a matching
µl =

s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
300 0 741

t = l + 1: a) Sd1l+1 = {s1}, Sd2l+1 = {s1, s3}, implying that department d1 offers
ms1d1(l + 1) = σs1d1 = 400 to student s1,
4
department d2 offers ms1d2(l + 1) = 300 to student s1 and ms3d2(l + 1) = 741 to
student s3.
b) Student s1 accepts department d2’s offer and rejects department d1’s offer,
student s2 has no offer, and
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer.
c) So, T d1l+1 = ∅, T d2l+1 = {s1, s3}, yielding the matching
µl+1 =

s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
300 0 741

Now department d1 and department d2 compete for student s1. However
the maximal offer that department d2 makes to student s1 is equal to 334 =
1075− 741 = bd2 −ms3d2(l + 1). Hence at some time t¯ we have following:
t = t¯: a) Sd1t¯ = {s1}, Sd2t¯ = {s1, s3}, so that department d1 offers ms1d1(t¯) =
435 to student {s1},
department d2 offers ms1d2(t¯) = 334 to student s1 and ms3d2(t¯) = 741 to student
s3.
4Department d1 offers to student s1 as the first time at time l+1, so ms1d1(l+1) = σs1d1 =
400.
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b) Student s1 accepts department d1’s offer and rejects department d2’s offer,
student s2 has no offer, while
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer.
c) Thus, T d1t¯ = {s1}, T d2t¯ = {s3}, and we have the matching
µt¯ =

s1 s2 s3
d1 ∅ d2
435 0 741

t = t¯+ 1: a) Now Sd1t¯+1 = {s1}, Sd2t¯+1 = {s2}.
In here, note that department d2’s preference relation violates the gross sub-
stitutes condition, since department d2 broke its tie with student s3 even though
the offer ms3d2(t¯+ 1) does not increase, i.e., ms3d2(t¯+ 1) = m
µt¯
s3d2
but s3 /∈ Sd2t¯+1.
Department d1 offers ms1d1(t¯+ 1) = 435 to student s1,
department d2 offers ms2d2(t¯+ 1) = σs2d2 = 1000 to student s2.
b) Student s1 accepts department d1’s offer,
student s2 accepts department d2’s offer, while
student s3 has no offer.
c) Hence T d1t¯+1 = {s1}, T d2t¯+1 = {s2}.
At time t¯+ 1 we obtain matching
µt¯+1 =

s1 s2 s3
d1 d2 ∅
435 1000 0

t = t¯ + 2: a) Here Sd1t¯+2 = {s3}, Sd2t¯+2 = {s2}, whence department d1 offers
ms3d1(t¯+ 2) = 440 = ms3d1(l) to student s3,
5
department d2 offers ms2d2(t¯+ 2) = 1000 to student s2.
5Department d1 is supposed to make this offer since student s3 is unmatched under µt¯+1.
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b) Student s1 has no offer,
student s2 accepts department d2’s offer,
student s3 accepts department d1’s offer.
c) So T d1t¯+2 = {s3}, T d2t¯+2 = {s2}.
At time t = t¯+ 2, this yields the matching
µt¯+2 =

s1 s2 s3
∅ d2 d1
0 1000 440

t = t¯+ 3: a) Now Sd1t¯+3 = {s3}, Sd2t¯+3 = {s1, s3}.
Department d1 offers ms3d1(t¯+ 3) = 440 to student s3,
department d2 offers ms1d2(t¯ + 3) = 334 = ms1d2(t¯) to student s1
6 and ms3d2(t¯ +
3) = 741 = ms3d2(t¯) to student s3.
7
b) Student s1 accepts department d2’s offer,
student s2 has no offer,
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer and rejects department d1’s offer.
c) Thus, T d1t¯+3 = ∅, T d2t¯+3 = {s1, s3}.
At time t¯+ 3 we have the matching
µt¯+3 =

s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
334 0 741

t = t¯+ 4: a) In this period, Sd1t¯+4 = {s1}, Sd2t¯+4 = {s1, s3}.
Department d1 offers ms1d1(t¯+ 4) = 435 to student s1,
department d2 offers ms1d2(t¯ + 4) = 334 to student s1 and ms3d2(t¯ + 4) = 741 to
6Department d2 makes this offer since student s1 is unmatched under µt¯+2.
7Department d2 makes this offer since it broke ties with student s3 at time t¯+1, so s3 /∈ F d2t¯+3.
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student s3.
b) Student s1 accepts department d1’s offer, and rejects department d2’s offer,
student s2 has no offer,
student s3 accepts department d2’s offer.
c) Hence, T d1t¯+4 = {s1}, T d2t¯+4 = {s3}, yielding the matching
µt¯+4 =

s1 s2 s3
d1 ∅ d2
435 0 741

Note that µt¯+4=µt¯. If we continue to apply GAA we get following matchings
at further periods:
µt¯+5 = µt¯+1, µt¯+6 = µt¯+2, µt¯+7 = µt¯+3, µt¯+8 = µt¯+4=µt¯.
The finite tuple of matchings (µt¯, µt¯+1, µt¯+2, µt¯+3) repeats itself infinitely many
times in the algorithm. Hence the algorithm does not stop in this example.
Note that there is no core stable matching in this example, since there is
neither a core stable matching such that student s2 is matched with a department,
nor a core stable matching under which she is unmatched.
In the previous example, we see that the algorithmGAA does not stop because
a finite tuple of matchings repeats itself, that is a cycle occurs in GAA. So we
will define formally what we mean by a cycle.
Definition 10 We say that a cycle occurs in the algorithm if there is a finite
sequence of matchings (µt0 , µt0+1, . . . , µt¯−1) (t0 < t¯) such that, for every t > t0,
µt = µt0+r, where 0 ≤ r < t¯− t0 and t ≡ r (mod t¯− t0).
We have seen it is possible that the algorithm GAA does not stop. But is it
also possible that the algorithm GAA does not stop while no cycle occurs in the
algorithm? The following proposition answers this question.
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Proposition 4 The algorithm GAA stops if and only if no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
Proof It is obvious that if the algorithm GAA stops, then no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
For the other part of the proof, assume that the algorithm GAA does not stop.
Let M denote the set of all matchings that occur in the algorithm GAA. Note
that the set of all possible matchings for a given graduate admission problem is
finite, since D and S are finite, and the money transfers between matched agents
are integers. Therefore M is finite.
Let O denote the set of all pairs (s, d) ∈ S × D such that d makes an offer
to s in the algorithm GAA. In the algorithm, there is a time t¯ such that for
any (s, d) ∈ O, department d proposes its maximal transfer to student s in the
algorithm at any t < t¯ such that d makes an offer to s in period t.
Letting m¯sd denote the maximal transfer that department d offers to student
s in the algorithm GAA, we have, for any t > t¯, msd(t) = m¯sd, if d makes an offer
to s at t.
Since M is finite, there is a matching µ¯ such that it occurs infinitely many
times in the algorithm GAA. Let tk be a time such that tk > t¯ and µtk = µ¯.
Claim 1: It is impossible that for all times t > tk, µt = µ¯.
Proof of claim 1: Suppose not, i.e., suppose that for all times t > tk, µt = µ¯.
Since the algorithm GAA does not stop, at each time t there is at least one
department d such that Sdt 6= T dt−1.
Moreover, for all times t > tk, we have that, for any (s, d) ∈ O, msd(t) = m¯sd
if s gets an offer from d at t. But this fact together with the finiteness of D and
S implies that there is some time t? > tk such that for all d ∈ D, Sdt? = T dt?−1, in
contradiction with that GAA does not stop. Hence it is impossible for all times
t > tk to have µt = µ¯. This completes the proof of claim 1.
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Claim 1 implies that there is a matching µ˜ which is different than µ¯ such that
µtk+1 = µ˜.
Applying Claim 1 to µ˜, we can say that it is impossible for all times t > tk+1
to have µt = µ˜. So there is another matching µˆ which is different than µ˜ such
that µtk+2 = µˆ.
As matching µ¯ occurs infinitely many times in the algorithm, at some further
time, again we have matching µ¯. That is there is a time tl > tk such that µtl = µ¯.
Hence we get a finite tuple of matchings (µ¯,µ˜,µˆ,. . .,µtl−1). Let C denotes this
finite tuple of matchings.
Claim 2: µtl+1 = µ˜.
Proof of claim 2: Note that µtk = µ¯ and µtk+1 = µ˜ such that µ˜ is different
than µ¯. So there is at least a department d and a student s such that µ¯1(s) 6= d
but µ˜1(s) = d. That is department d makes an offer to students s at period tk+1
and s accepts d’s offer. Hence s /∈ F dtk+1.
We will show that s /∈ F dtl+1, i.e., the algorithm requires that d makes an offer
to s at period tl + 1. We have two cases to consider that either µ¯1(s) = ∅ or
µ¯1(s) = dˆ.
If µ¯1(s) = ∅, then we have that she is again unmatched at the end of period
tl, since µtk = µtl = µ¯. So s /∈ F dtl+1.
Now assume that µ¯1(s) = dˆ. Note that d makes an offer to s at period tk + 1
and s accepts d’s offer, and we have for all times t > t¯, msd(t) = m¯sd for any
(s, d) ∈ O if s gets an offer from d at period t. Hence we have (d, m¯sd)Ps(dˆ, m¯sdˆ).
That is s do not reject d’s offer because of dˆ’s offer. So s /∈ F dtl+1. Hence at time
tl + 1, again d makes an offer to s, and she accepts it, i.e., d and s again get
matched at the end of period tl+1. Note that this is true for all pairs (s, d) such
that µ¯1(s) 6= d but µ˜1(s) = d. So we have µtl+1 = µ˜, which completes the proof
of claim 2.
Applying claim 2 to µtl+1 = µ˜, we get the matching µˆ at the end of period
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tl + 2.
Hence by applying claim 2 to each matching in C, we see that C repeats
itself infinitely many times in the algorithm GAA. This completes the proof of
proposition.

In the example 4 above the algorithm GAA does not stop and there is no
core stable matching. The following example shows that it is also possible that
the algorithm GAA does not stop while there is a core stable matching.
Example 5 The algorithm GAA does not stop and there is a core stable
matching
Let D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}
the set of students, where the quotas and budgets of the departments are as
follows: qd1 = 1, qd2 = 2, qd3 = 1, qd4 = 2; bd1 = 440, bd2 = 1075, bd3 = 440,
bd4 = 1075. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as
given in table 4.2.
as1d1= 7 a
s1
d2
= 11 as1d3= 4 a
s1
d4
= 0
as2d1= 0 a
s2
d2
= 15 as2d3= 0 a
s2
d4
= 2
as3d1= 8 a
s3
d2
= 12 as3d3= 0 a
s3
d4
= 1
as4d1= 4 a
s4
d2
= 0 as4d3= 7 a
s4
d4
= 11
as5d1= 0 a
s5
d2
= 2 as5d3= 0 a
s5
d4
= 15
as6d1= 0 a
s6
d2
= 1 as6d3= 8 a
s6
d4
= 12
σs1d1= 400 σs1d2= 300 σs1d3=−500 σs1d4= 440
σs2d1= 440 σs2d2= 1075 σs2d3= 400 σs2d4=−500
σs3d1= 400 σs3d2= 700 σs3d3= 420 σs3d4=−500
σs4d1=−500 σs4d2= 450 σs4d3= 400 σs4d4= 300
σs5d1= 400 σs5d2=−500 σs5d3= 440 σs5d4= 1075
σs6d1= 420 σs6d2=−500 σs6d3= 400 σs6d4= 700
Table 4.2: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 5
If we apply the algorithm GAA, then a cycle occurs consisting of the following
three matchings:
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µt¯ =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d1 ∅ d2 d3 ∅ d4
435 0 741 435 0 741

µt¯+1 =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d1 d4 ∅ d3 d2 ∅
435 −500 0 435 −500 0

µt¯+2 =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
∅ d4 d2 ∅ d2 d4
0 −500 741 0 −500 741

However, there is a core stable matching.
Consider the matching
µ =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d3 d4 d4 d1 d2 d2
440 500 575 440 500 575

It is easy to see that the matching µ is core stable. Hence, it is possible that
the algorithm GAA does not stop, but there is a core stable matching. Therefore,
we cannot say that if the algorithm GAA does not stop, then the set of core stable
matchings is empty.
We say that a core stable matching is department optimal if every depart-
ment likes it at least as well as any other core stable matching. Similarly, we say
that a core stable matching is student optimal if every student likes it at least
as well as any other core stable matching.
For the college admissions problem with colleges having quota constraints
only, we know that there are a college optimal and a student optimal matching.
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However, the following examples show that there is neither a department optimal
nor a student optimal matching for the graduate admission problem with quota
and budget constraints.
Example 6 There is no department optimal matching
Let D = {d1, d2} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3} the set of students
with the quotas and budgets of the departments as follows: qd1 = qd2 = 2;
bd1 = bd2 = 100. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the students
are as given in table 4.3.
as1d1= 1 a
s1
d2
= 1
as2d1=10 a
s2
d2
= 0
as3d1= 0 a
s3
d2
=10
σs1d1=10 σs1d2=20
σs2d1=50 σs2d2=60
σs3d1=50 σs3d2=60
Table 4.3: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 6
Consider the matching
µ =

s1 s2 s3
d1 d1 d2
30 50 60

which can easily be checked to be the outcome of GAA.
Now considering the matching
µ˜ =

s1 s2 s3
d2 d1 d2
20 100 80

we see that both µ and µ˜ are core stable, while µPd1µ˜ and µ˜Pd2µ. Moreover,
there is no other core stable matching such that both d1 and d2 like it at least as
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well as any other core stable matching. Therefore there is no department optimal
matching.
Example 7 There is no student optimal matching
LetD = {d1, d2} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3} the set of students,
where the quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qd1 = 2, qd2 = 1;
bd1 = bd2 = 100. The qualification levels and reservation prices of the students
are as given in table 4.4.
as1d1= 1 a
s1
d2
= 0
as2d1= 5 a
s2
d2
= 0
as3d1= 0 a
s3
d2
=10
σs1d1=50 σs1d2=60
σs2d1=50 σs2d2=60
σs3d1=50 σs3d2=60
Table 4.4: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 7
Consider the matching
µ =

s1 s2 s3
d1 d1 d2
50 50 60

which turns out to be the outcome of GAA for this problem.
Now consider the matching
µ˜ =

s1 s2 s3
∅ d1 d2
0 100 100

Similarly as above, both µ and µ˜ are core stable, while µPs1µ˜ and µ˜Ps2µ.
Moreover, there is no other core stable matching such that both s1 and s2 like it
35
at least as well as any other core stable matching. Therefore there is no student
optimal matching.
Note that µ1(s1) ∈ D but µ˜1(s1) = ∅. Therefore it is possible that there be
core stable matchings µ and µ˜ such that there is a student s ∈ S, µ1(s) ∈ D but
µ˜1(s) = ∅.
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Chapter 5
Graduate Admission Algorithm
with Reservation Prices
In this chapter, we will modify students’ preferences in such a way that stu-
dents now consider only reservation prices and do not derive further utility from
money transfer over and above their reservation prices. Then we construct an-
other graduate admission algorithm ( ˜GAA) by taking the reservation prices of
students equal to the money transfers from the department to which they are
accepted. The algorithm ˜GAA is another extension of the Gale - Shapley algo-
rithm. However, like GAA, ˜GAA does not always stop, and it is possible that
there exists a core stable matching although ˜GAA does not stop.
Students’ Preferences
Again we assume that (d, σsd)Ps(d˜, σsd˜) if and only if σsd < σsd˜.
Note that proposition 1 and 2 continue to be true if students consider only
reservation prices, and similar examples of chapter 3 can easily be constructed
for this model as well.
Now we will define how the algorithm ˜GAA works.
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The algorithm ˜GAA
The structure of ˜GAA is the same as that of GAA, the only difference being
that a department d which makes an offer to a student s is ready to pay σsd to
s no matter at what stage of the algorithm this offer is made. In other words,
msd(t) = σsd for all s ∈ S, d ∈ D and all times t at which d makes an offer to s.
At each time t in the algorithm ˜GAA, each department d chooses a group
of admissible students Sdt satisfying its quota and budget constraints so as to
maximize its total benefit Y dt .
t = 1: a) Each department d determines a group of students Sd1 ⊆ S as
denoted above and offers to each student s ∈ Sd1 .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d accepts the group of students who accepted its offers. Let T d1
denote the group of students who accepted department d’s offers at time t = 1,
where clearly T d1 ⊆ Sd1 .
Now, at the end of period t = 1 we have a matching µ1, and so S
d
µ1
= T d1 .
t = 2: a) Each department d determines a group of students Sd2 ⊆ S \(Sd1 \T d1 )
and makes an offer to each student s ∈ Sd2 .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d accepts the group of students who accepted its offers.
In general, at time k, the algorithm works as follows.
t = k: a) Now we will define in general what we mean by an admissible group
of students for department d, i.e, we will define the set F dk ⊆ S for department d
at time k.
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Assume that t˜ < k was the last time that d made an offer to s before time k
when s rejected d’s offer because of another department dˆ’s offer. Department d
cannot make an offer to student s at time k, if µk−1(s) = dˆ. The set F dk denotes
the group of all such students for department d at time k, i.e., the group of
students to whom department d cannot make offers at time k.1
Each department d chooses its group of students Sdk from S \F dk and offers to
each student s ∈ Sdk .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and
reject the others.
c) Department d accepts the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk who accepted its
offers.
Stopping Rule
t = t?: The algorithm stops at time t? if each department d makes offers
exactly to the group of students who accepted its offers at t? − 1, i.e., if we have
Sdt? = T
d
t?−1 for all d ∈ D.
If the algorithm stops at time t?, the matching µt? is regarded as the outcome
of the algorithm.
Proposition 5 If the algorithm ˜GAA stops, then the final matching of the algo-
rithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
Proof Assume that the algorithm stops. Let the algorithm stop at time t?, and
let the matching µt? denote the outcome of the algorithm. So we have S
d
t? = T
d
t?−1
for all d ∈ D. We abuse notation that we use µ? for µt? .
Clearly µ? is individually rational, since for all s ∈ S, mµ?sµ?1(s) = σsµ?1(s), and
for all d ∈ D, Y dµ? ≥ 0.
1At time t = 1, we have that for all d ∈ D, F d1 = ∅, so each department d determines its
group of students Sd1 over the set of all students S. At time t = 2, for all d ∈ D, F d2 = Sd1 \ T d1 ,
so the admissible group for department d at time 2 is S \ (Sd1 \ T d1 ).
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Now suppose that µ? is not core stable. Then there is a group (d, S˜) which
blocks µ?. So we have that
1. for all s ∈ S˜, µ?1(s) 6= d,
2. for all s ∈ S˜, (d, σsd)Ps(µ?1(s), σsµ?1(s)),
3. [(Sdµ? \B)
⋃
S˜, cˆd]Pd[S
d
µ? , c
d
µ? ], for some B ⊆ Sdµ? .
Claim: There is no student s ∈ S˜ such that s ∈ F dt? .2
Proof of claim: Suppose not, i.e., suppose there is a student s ∈ S˜ such that
s ∈ F dt? . That is department d offered to student s ∈ S˜ at some time t˜ < t? as
the last time before time t? and student s rejected d’s offer because of another
department’s offer, say department dˆ’s offer, and µt?−1(s) = dˆ.3 So we have that
4. (dˆ, σsdˆ)Ps(d, σsd).
As µt?−1(s) = dˆ and the algorithm stops at time t?, we have that µ?1(s) = dˆ.
Now by (2), we have (d, σsd)Ps(dˆ, σsdˆ). This contradicts with (4). Hence there is
no student s ∈ S˜ such that s ∈ F dt? .
The above claim implies that S˜ ⊆ (S \ F dt?), i.e., the algorithm allows depart-
ment d to make offers to each s ∈ S˜. Therefore department d would offer to
each student s ∈ S˜ (by 3), and each student s ∈ S˜ would accept it (by 2), in
contradiction with that for all s ∈ S˜, µ?1(s) 6= d. Hence µ? is core stable, and thus
Pareto optimal.

2Note that there is no student s ∈ (Sdµ? \ B) such that s ∈ F dt? , since for all s ∈ (Sdµ? \ B),
µ?1(s) = d.
3Note that in here we abuse the notation that µt?−1(s) denotes the department that s is
matched under µt?−1.
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The following example shows that there can be more than one core stable
matching in our model where only reservation prices of students are considered.
Example 8 There is more than one core stable matching
The set of departments is D = {d1, d2, d3}, the set of students is S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4,s5,s6,s7,s8}, and the quotas and budgets of departments are given
by qd1 = 3, qd2 = 3, qd3 = 2; bd1 = 45, bd2 = 50, bd3 = 25. The qualification levels
and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.1.
as1d1=15 a
s1
d2
= 0 as1d3= 0
as2d1=20 a
s2
d2
= 0 as2d3= 0
as3d1=10 a
s3
d2
= 0 as3d3=15
as4d1= 0 a
s4
d2
=11 as4d3= 0
as5d1=15 a
s5
d2
=15 as5d3= 0
as6d1= 0 a
s6
d2
=10 as6d3=12
as7d1= 0 a
s7
d2
= 0 as7d3=10
as8d1= 0 a
s8
d2
=10 as8d3= 0
σs1d1=10 σs1d2=20 σs1d3=25
σs2d1=10 σs2d2=20 σs2d3=25
σs3d1=15 σs3d2=20 σs3d3=25
σs4d1=28 σs4d2=20 σs4d3=25
σs5d1=25 σs5d2=21 σs5d3=22
σs6d1=30 σs6d2=20 σs6d3=10
σs7d1=25 σs7d2=40 σs7d3= 0
σs8d1=30 σs8d2=10 σs8d3=20
Table 5.1: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 8
When writing a matching, we will not write the money transfers between
matched agents, since all money transfers between matched agents are the reser-
vation prices of the students. Consider the following matching
µ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
d1 d1 d1 d2 d2 d3 d3 ∅
)
Note that the matching µ is core stable. The best group for department d1
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is {s1, s2, s5}, and Sd1µ = {s1, s2, s3}, and department d1 prefers student s5 to
student s3. However (d2, 21)Ps5(d1, 25), i.e., student s5 does not form a blocking
pair with department d1. Hence there is no group involving department d1 which
blocks µ.
The best group for department d2 is {s4, s6, s8}, and Sd2µ = {s4, s5}. The
group (d2, {s6, s8}) cannot block µ, since (d3, 10)Ps6(d2, 20). The group (d2, s8)
cannot block µ, since σs4d2 + σs5d2 + σs8d2 = 20 + 21 + 10 = 51 > 50 = bd2 and
as4d2 = 11 > 10 = a
s8
d2
, as5d2 = 15 > 10 = a
s8
d2
. Hence there is no group involving
department d2 which blocks µ.
The best group for department d3 is {s3, s7}, and Sd3µ = {s6, s7}. However
(d1, 15)Ps3(d3, 25), i.e., student s3 does not form a blocking pair with department
d3. Hence there is no group involving department d3 which blocks µ.
If we apply the algorithm ˜GAA, we get the matching
µ˜ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
d1 d1 d3 d2 d1 d2 d3 d2
)
Clearly µ˜ is core stable, and different than µ.
Hence it is possible that there be more than one core stable matching.
This example also shows that there is no student optimal matching for this
model. Since µPs2µ˜ but µ˜Ps8µ.
Also note that µ1(s8) = ∅, µ˜1(s8) = d2, so it is possible that there be two
core stable matchings µ and µ˜ such that there is a student s ∈ S with µ1(s) = ∅,
µ˜1(s) ∈ D.
Now we will give an example that the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop and there
is no core stable matching.
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Example 9 The algorithm ˜GAA does not stop and there is no core
stable matching
Let D = {d1, d2}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qd1 = 1, qd2 = 2, bd1 = 50, bd2 = 70, and the
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.2.
as1d1=10 a
s1
d2
=10
as2d1= 1 a
s2
d2
=15
as3d1= 8 a
s3
d2
= 9
σs1d1=50 σs1d2=30
σs2d1=50 σs2d2=45
σs3d1=30 σs3d2=40
Table 5.2: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 9
Now we apply the algorithm ˜GAA,
t = 1: a) Sd11 = {s1}, Sd21 = {s1, s3}; and department d1 offers to student s1,
department d2 offers to students {s1} and s3.
b) Student s1 accepts d2’s offer and rejects d1’s offer; student s2 has no offer;
student s3 accepts d2’s offer.
c) We obtain a matching
µ1 =
(
s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
)
t = 2: a) Sd12 = {s3}, Sd21 = {s1, s3}; and department d1 offers to student s2,
department d2 offers to students {s1} and s3.
b) Student s1 accepts d2’s offer; student s2 has no offer; student s3 accepts
d1’s offer and rejects d2’s offer.
c) We obtain a matching
µ2 =
(
s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d1
)
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t = 3: a) Sd13 = {s3}, Sd23 = {s2};4 and department d1 offers to student s3,
department d2 offers to student s2.
b) Student s1 has no offer; student s2 accepts d2’s offer; student s3 accepts
d1’s offer.
c) We obtain a matching
µ3 =
(
s1 s2 s3
∅ d2 d1
)
t = 4: a) Sd14 = {s1}, Sd24 = {s2}; and department d1 offers to student s1,
department d2 offers to student s2.
b) Student s1 accepts d1’s offer; student s2 accepts d2’s offer; student s3 has
no offer.
c) We obtain a matching
µ4 =
(
s1 s2 s3
d1 d2 ∅
)
t = 5: a) Sd15 = {s1}, Sd25 = {s1, s3}; and department d1 offers to student s1,
department d2 offers to students s1 and s3.
b) Student s1 accepts d2’s offer and rejects d1’s offer; student s2 has no offer;
student s3 accepts d2’s offer.
c) We obtain a matching
µ5 =
(
s1 s2 s3
d2 ∅ d2
)
Note that µ5 = µ1, and if we continue we get that µ6 = µ2, µ7 = µ3, µ8 = µ4.
4Note that department d2’s preference relation violates the gross substitutes condition.
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That is (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) repeats itself infinitely many times in the algorithm ˜GAA.
Hence the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop.
Note that there is no core stable matching for this example, since there is
neither a core stable matching such that student s2 is matched with a department,
nor a core stable matching under which she is unmatched.
The following proposition shows that it is impossible that the algorithm ˜GAA
does not stop and no cycle occurs in the algorithm.
Proposition 6 The algorithm ˜GAA stops if and only if no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
Proof The proof is similar to that of proposition 4. 
The following example shows that the algorithm ˜GAA may not stop even if
there is a core stable matching.
Example 10 The algorithm ˜GAA does not stop and there is a core stable
matching
Let D = {d1, d2, d3, d4} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}
the set of students and the quotas and budgets of the departments are given by
qd1 = 1, qd2 = 2, qd3 = 1, qd4 = 2; bd1 = 50, bd2 = 70, bd3 = 50, bd4 = 70. The
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.3.
If we apply the algorithm ˜GAA, we get the following matchings:
At the end of time t = 1, we have
µ1 =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d2 ∅ d2 d4 ∅ d4
)
At the end of time t = 2, we have
µ2 =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d2 ∅ d1 d4 ∅ d3
)
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as1d1=10 a
s1
d2
=10 as1d3= 5 a
s1
d4
= 0
as2d1= 1 a
s2
d2
=15 as2d3= 0 a
s2
d4
= 3
as3d1= 8 a
s3
d2
= 9 as3d3= 0 a
s3
d4
= 3
as4d1= 6 a
s4
d2
= 0 as4d3=10 a
s4
d4
=10
as5d1= 0 a
s5
d2
= 3 as5d3= 1 a
s5
d4
=15
as6d1= 0 a
s6
d2
= 3 as6d3= 8 a
s6
d4
= 9
σs1d1=50 σs1d2=30 σs1d3=20 σs1d4=40
σs2d1=50 σs2d2=45 σs2d3=40 σs2d4=30
σs3d1=30 σs3d2=40 σs3d3=45 σs3d4=28
σs4d1=20 σs4d2=40 σs4d3=50 σs4d4=30
σs5d1=40 σs5d2=30 σs5d3=50 σs5d4=45
σs6d1=45 σs6d2=28 σs6d3=30 σs6d4=40
Table 5.3: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 10
At the end of time t = 3, we have
µ3 =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
∅ d2 d1 ∅ d4 d3
)
At the end of time t = 4, we have
µ4 =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d1 d2 ∅ d3 d4 ∅
)
If we continue to apply our algorithm we obtain the result that µ5 = µ1,
µ6 = µ2, µ7 = µ3, µ8 = µ4. That is (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) repeats itself infinitely many
times in the algorithm ˜GAA. Hence the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop.
However there is a core stable matching for this example. Consider the match-
ing
µ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d3 d4 d4 d1 d2 d2
)
The matching µ is core stable, since each student s ∈ S is matched with her
best department under µ. So there is no group of student who forms a blocking
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coalition with any department. Hence it is possible that the algorithm does not
stop and there is a core stable matching.
Example 11 There is no department optimal matching if students con-
sider only reservation prices
Let D = {d1, d2} be the set of departments, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} the set of
students and the quotas and budgets of the departments are given by qd1 = 2,
qd2 = 2; bd1 = 102, bd2 = 100. The qualification levels and reservation prices of
the students are as given in table 5.4.
as1d1=20 a
s1
d2
=20
as2d1=15 a
s2
d2
=15
as3d1=12 a
s3
d2
=16
as4d1=13 a
s4
d2
=16
σs1d1=55 σs1d2=60
σs2d1=45 σs2d2=40
σs3d1=51 σs3d2=50
σs4d1=51 σs4d2=50
Table 5.4: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 11
Consider the matching
µ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4
d1 d1 d2 d2
)
Note that µ is core stable. Department d1 is matched with its best group under
µ, so there is no group including department d1 which forms a blocking coalition.
The best group for department d2 is {s1, s2}, while Sd2µ = {s3, s4}. Student s1
does not form a blocking coalition with department d2 since (d1, 55)Ps1(d2, 60).
And department d2 does not form a blocking coalition only with student s2, since
as3d2 = a
s4
d2
= 16 > 15 = as2d2 . So there is no group consisting of department d2 and
some students which forms a blocking coalition. Hence µ is core stable.
Now consider the matching
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µ˜ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4
d2 d2 d1 d1
)
Note that µ˜ is core stable. Department d2 is matched with its best group under
µ˜, so there is no group including department d2 which forms a blocking coalition.
The best group for department d1 is {s1, s2} and Sd1µ˜ = {s3, s4}. Student s2 does
not form a blocking coalition with department d1 since (d2, 40)Ps2(d1, 45). And
department d1 cannot form a blocking coalition with student s3, since σs3d1 +
σs1d1 = 106 > 102 = bd1 . Similarly department d1 can not form a blocking
coalition with student s4, since σs4d1 + σs1d1 = 106 > 102 = bd1 . So there is no
group involving department d1 which forms a blocking coalition. Hence µ˜ is core
stable.
However we have that µPd1µ˜ and µ˜Pd2µ. Hence there is no department optimal
matching for the model where students consider only reservation prices.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 Discussion
We start this section with some observations. If we go back to example 4 where
the algorithm GAA does not stop, we see that there is a pairwise stable and
Pareto optimal matching in the cycle that occurs there.
In that example, the matching µt¯+2 is both pairwise stable and Pareto optimal,
where
µt¯+2 =

s1 s2 s3
∅ d2 d1
0 1000 440

This observation motivated us to write another algorithm to find pairwise
stable matchings. We define a new graduate admission algorithm GAAref which
can be regarded as a refinement of the algorithm GAA.
The algorithm GAAref
The rules of the algorithm GAAref are the same as the rules of GAA with the
exception that, at each time t, each department d can now make only one new
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offer. That is, at each time t, each department d can make offers in addition to
the students in T dt−1 to only one student s ∈ S with s /∈ T dt−1. Hence we have that∣∣Sdt ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣T dt−1∣∣+ 1.
Proposition 7 If the algorithm GAAref stops, then the final matching of the
algorithm is pairwise stable.
Proof Assume that the algorithm GAAref stops at time t?. Let µ? denote the
final matching of the algorithm. Clearly µ? is individually rational.
Now suppose that µ? is not pairwise stable. Then there is a pair (s, d) ∈
S × D with µ?1(s) 6= d that blocks µ?. Let m˜sd denote the money transfer from
department d to student s .
However, as in the the proof of proposition 3, according to the algorithm
department d could have offered m˜sd to student s, and therefore would have
matched with student s, if that were the case.
Hence µ? is pairwise stable.

However, if the algorithm GAAref stops, this does not guarantee the Pareto
optimality of the final matching. For example, if we apply the algorithm GAAref
to the graduate admission problem of example 2, the algorithm stops and the
final matching is µ given in there. As noted in example 2, µ is pairwise stable
but not Pareto optimal.
We record the following statement that has not been either proven or disproven
as a conjecture.
Conjecture 1: The algorithm GAAref stops in a finite time.
Now consider examples 9 and 10 in which the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop,
but there is a pairwise stable and Pareto optimal matching that is a member of
the occurring cycle.
50
In example 9 there is no core stable matching either. The matching µ4 is
however, both pairwise stable and Pareto optimal, where
µ4 =
(
s1 s2 s3
d1 d2 ∅
)
In example 10, the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop but there is a core stable
matching. The matching µ4 there,is both pairwise stable and Pareto optimal,
where
µ4 =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
d1 d2 ∅ d3 d4 ∅
)
These observations motivated us to introduce yet another algorithm in an
attempt to find pairwise stable matchings when students care only about getting
their reservation prices. Here we define a new graduate admission algorithm
( ˜GAA
ref
) which can be regarded as a refinement of the algorithm ˜GAA.
The algorithm ˜GAA
ref
The rules of the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
are the same as the rules of ˜GAA with the
exception that, at each time t, each department d can now make only one new
offer. That is at each time t, each department d can make offers in addition to
the students in T dt−1 to only one student s ∈ S with s /∈ T dt−1. Hence we have that∣∣Sdt ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣T dt−1∣∣+ 1.
Proposition 8 If the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
stops, then the final matching of the
algorithm is pairwise stable.
Proof Assume that the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
stops at time t?. Let µ? denote the
final matching of the algorithm. Clearly µ? is individually rational.
Now suppose that µ? is not pairwise stable. Then there is a pair (s, d) ∈
S ×D with µ?1(s) 6= d that blocks µ?. Remember that the money transfer from
department d to student s is simply σsd if s accepts d’s offer.
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However, as in the proof of proposition 5, according to the algorithm, de-
partment d could have made the offer σsd to student s, i.e., s /∈ F dt? . Therefore
department d and student s would have matched in the outcome of the algorithm,
a contradiction.
Hence µ? is pairwise stable.

However, even if the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
stops then the final matching need
not be Pareto optimal.
The following statement is neither proven nor disproven so far and is thus
recorded as a conjecture.
Conjecture 2: The algorithm ˜GAA
ref
stops in a finite time.
There are examples where ˜GAA does not stop, but ˜GAA
ref
does. For example,
consider example 9 in which the algorithm ˜GAA does not stop and there is no
core stable matching. The block of matchings (µ1,µ2,µ3,µ4) repeats itself infinitely
under ˜GAA. Now starting from time t = 5, if we apply the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
,
the algorithm ˜GAA
ref
stops at time t = 6, and µ6 = µ4 which is pairwise stable
and Pareto optimal.
6.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have studied the graduate admission problem with quota and
budget constraints as a two sided matching market. We have defined an algorithm
(GAA) which is an extension of the Gale - Shapley algorithm. We showed that if
the algorithm GAA stops then the final matching is core stable (and thus Pareto
optimal). However the algorithm GAA does not always stop, and it is possible
that the algorithm GAA does not stop while the set of core stable matchings is
nonempty. Also there is neither a department optimal matching nor a student
optimal matching under budget constraints.
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We have also studied the model that students only consider reservation prices.
We have defined another algorithm ( ˜GAA) that is again an extension of the Gale
- Shapley algorithm. We showed that if the algorithm ˜GAA stops then the final
matching is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal). However, the algorithm ˜GAA
does not always stop, and it is again possible that the algorithm ˜GAA does not
stop while the set of core stable matchings is nonempty. Also if students only care
about their reservation prices there are no department optimal matching and no
student optimal matching.
We obtain similar results under algorithms GAA and ˜GAA. Hence we can
say that in the model defined in this thesis (two sided matching market with
quota and budget constraints), straightforward extensions of the Gale - Shapley
algorithm do not function as well as it works for college admissions and labor
market models without budget constraints.
We also defined certain refinements of GAA and ˜GAA, called GAAref and
˜GAA
ref
which yield pairwise stable matchings if they stop. However, whether
these must stop or not, or whether there always exist pairwise stable matchings
in our framework with budget constraints or not stays as an open problem yet to
be explored.
53
Bibliography
[1] Gale, D., and L. Shapley, (1962) “College Admissions and the Stability of
Marriage”, American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9-15.
[2] Hall, P. (1935)“On representatives of subsets,”, J. London Math. Soc., 10:
26-30.
[3] Kelso, A. S. DR and V. P. Crawford, (1982) “Job Matching, Coalition
Formation and Gross Substitutes”, Econometrica, 50(6): 1483-1504.
[4] Mongell S. J. and A. E. Roth, (1986) “A Note on Job Matching with Budget
Constraints” Economics Letters, 21: 135-138.
[5] Roth, A. E. (1984) “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns
and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory”, The Journal of Political
Economy, 92(6): 991-1016.
[6] and M. A. O. Sotomayor, (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in
Game-Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
54
